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1 Introduction
There exist many economic interactions that can be modeled as a rent-seeking
contest. Typical examples include political lobbying, patent races or promo-
tions. In all these examples, the contestants expend resources in order to be
awarded a pre-specied rent. Due to this ubiquity of contest-like situations,
economists have studied contests in many di¤erent settings. For instance, dif-
ferent specications of simultaneous contests between individuals have been
analyzed by Tullock (1980), Lee (2000), Schoonbeek (2002), Epstein & Nitzan
(2002), Baye & Hoppe (2003), Baik (2004) or Malueg & Yates (2004). Se-
quential individual contests are dealt with in Dixit (1987), Leininger (1993),
Morgan (2003), Jost & Kräkel (2005) or Konrad & Leininger (2005). Further,
Katz et al. (1990), Nitzan (1991), Baik & Lee (1997), Lee & Kang (1998),
Davis & Reilly (1999), Müller & Wärneryd (2001), Ueda (2002), Gürtler &
Kräkel (2003), Stein & Rapoport (2004), Epstein & Nitzan (2004), Konrad
(2004), Schoonbeck (2004) and Gürtler (2005) apply the contest model to
analyze competition between groups.
In many real-world situations, the person expending resources and the
person obtaining the rent are not the same. This is oftentimes the case,
when rms are competing e.g. for a contract or a license. Then, employees
are usually the ones expending resources, while the rm owners receive the
rent. As known from the principal-agent literature, this separation of costs
and benets of rent-seeking activities leads to motivational problems (moral
hazard), as the employees are tempted to reduce expenditures to save on
costs. To mitigate these problems and to align the interests of employees
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with these of rm owners, rms incentivize the employees by rewarding them
for good performance.
Despite the multitude of papers dealing with contests, this delegation
of rent-seeking activities has not received much attention. An exception is
Schoonbeek (2002), (2004), who uses an incomplete contracting approach1
to analyze delegation of rent-seeking in both, an individual and a group
contest. Thereby, he focuses on the question, when delegation of rent-seeking
activities is protable. This will be the case, if (i) either the delegating party
is a strongly risk-averse individual and the rent is relatively high or (ii) the
delegating party is a relatively large group, which mitigates the free-rider
problem by means of delegation.
In this paper, it is supposed that the single rm owners are, e.g. due
to time constraints, forced to always delegate the rent seeking activities.
Then, they use incentive contracts to motivate their employees. We assume
contracting to be complete and maintain Schoonbeeks assumptions about
what information is veriable to courts. We analyze whether or not contracts
can be used as a commitment device. Following the literature on sequential
contests, we let one rm choose the contract parameters prior to another.
Under symmetric valuations for the rent, it is found that commitment via
1Incomplete contracting here means that Schoonbeek restricts the set of feasible con-
tracts. He assumes that a court can only distinguish between whether or not the rent has
been awarded to a rm. Therefore, a contract can specify two payments, one for the case
of a successful employee and one for the case of an unsuccessful employee. Schoonbeek,
however, normalizes this second payment to zero and so forbids the rms to choose from
a richer set of contracts.
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incentive contracts is protable. That is, a rm benets from moving rst
in the wage-setting subgame. This is surprising since Leininger (1993) has
shown that this will not be the case, if commitment occurs via rent-seeking
expenditures. This di¤erence in results can be explained as follows: By
acting as a rst-mover, one can commit to a certain behavior. In a contest,
for instance, one can choose an aggressive strategy in order to show the
opponent that one is extremely willing to win the contest. Committing to an
aggressive behavior via rent-seeking expenditures is very costly, as it requires
a high outlay choice. Therefore, it is unprotable. In contrast, commitment
via high-powered incentive contracts is only costly, if the opponent accepts
the challenge and reacts by choosing high-powered incentives as well. This,
however, will never be the case so that commitment is indeed protable in
the current model.
Besides its implications for the theory of rent-seeking contests, this paper
contributes to the literature emphasizing the commitment role of contracts.
Examples include Fershtman & Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Dewatripont
(1988), Segendor¤ (1998) or Cai & Cont (2004). In the rst two papers,
contracts are used to commit to a more favorable behavior in an oligopoly
game. In Dewatripont (1988), an incumbent signs a contract with a third
party (e.g. a labor union) in order to commit to an aggressive strategy, if
a potential entrant comes into the market. Finally, the commitment role of
contracts in bargaining situations is analyzed in the last two papers. The
current paper complements existing ideas by demonstrating that contracts
can also be e¤ective commitment devices in rent-seeking contests.
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The paper is organized as follows: The next section contains the model
description. The model is solved in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the model and notation
Consider two rms (i = 1, 2) that are in competition for a governmental
contract, which is of value S > 0 to the rm owners, respectively. Each
rm employs a risk-neutral "rent-seeker" (who is referred to as the agent)
choosing rent-seeking outlay xi (measured in monetary terms) in order to
inuence the governments decision. Firm is contest-success function, i.e.
its probability of being selected is given by (see e.g. Tullock (1980) or, for
an axiomatic approach, Skaperdas (1996))
Pi =
8><>:
xi
x1+x2
; for x1 + x2 > 0
0:5; otherwise
(1)
Let xi be unobservable. Thus, a rm cannot condition the compensation
of the agent on the chosen outlay. Instead, the only veriable information
is which rm is assigned the contract. Hence, a wage contract consists of
a pair (0i; 1i), where 0i denotes a xed payment from rm to agent and
1i a further payment that the agent receives, if the rm is selected by the
government. The agent is assumed to possess monetary resources w  0
and to be unable to get further credit. Hence, the contract parameters must
satisfy 0i    w.2 Determining the contract parameters, it is assumed that
2In particular, it must be that 0i    w and 0i+1i    w. Note that setting 1i < 0
does not make sense, as this would punish the agent for performing well. Hence 1i  0.
Then, the second condition is implied by the rst.
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the agent possesses complete bargaining power.3 This may be due to di¤er-
ent reasons: For instance, the agents may simply be the better bargainers.
Alternatively, there may be many rms, but only few agents in the market.
As a third explanation, one could think that the agent also works in other
projects for the rm. If the agent is of great importance for those other
projects, he may threat to leave the rm, if his share from achieved revenue
is smaller than 1. A consequence of the bargaining power assumption is that
each rm is constrained to make zero expected prot in the rent-seeking game
and chooses the contract parameters such that its agents expected utility is
maximized.4
The model consists of two stages: In the rst stage, the rms determine
the wage parameters, in the second stage, outlays are chosen. As outlays are
unobservable, the agents choose their outlays in a Cournot-fashion, that is,
an agent is unable to commit to a certain behavior by choosing outlay prior
to the other agent. In contrast, wage contracts are supposed to be observable.
Therefore, the rms are allowed to use the wage contracts as a commitment
device. Following Leininger (1993), in the wage-setting subgame, the order
of moves is endogenized. Each rm may choose to announce the contract
parameters at two di¤erent points in time, say at t = 1 or t = 2. If both rms
choose the same t, we have a simultaneous wage-setting subgame. Otherwise,
choices are made sequentially.
3Notice that all results to be derived will remain qualitatively unchanged, if the rms
possess complete bargaining power, the agentsreservation utilities are normalized to zero
and w  S4 .
4See, for example, Nalebu¤ & Stiglitz (1983).
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3 Solution to the model
3.1 A benchmark case
As a benchmark case, we present a model similar to the one of Leininger
(1993), where rent-seeking activities are not delegated. In the case of simul-
taneous outlay choices, rm 1 maximizes
1 =
x1
x1 + x2
S   x1 (2)
This yields the following rst-order condition:5
x2
(x1 + x2)
2S   1 = 0 (3)
Deriving a similar condition for the second rm shows that equilibrium is
symmetric and given by x1 = x2 = S4 . Expected prots are also the same
and equal 1 = 2 = S4 .
Let us now assume sequential actions, with rm 1 acting prior to rm
2. By choosing a certain outlay, rm 1 can now a¤ect rm 2s outlay, i.e.
rm 1 does no longer take the second rms outlay as given, while deciding
about x1. Firm 2s best response function follows from maximizing 2 and
equals x2 =
p
x1S   x1. Inserting this function into (2), leads to a prot of
1 =
p
x1S   x1 for rm 1. Maximizing this prot, leads to the following
rst-order condition:6
0:5
r
S
x1
  1 = 0, x1 = S
4
(4)
5The second-order condition is satised.
6The second-order condition is satised.
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This implies that the solution is the same as under simultaneous actions.
There is thus no rst-mover advantage. Firm 1 does not gain by acting
prior to rm 2. The next subsections show that this may not be true, if
commitment occurs via incentive contracts.
3.2 Outlay Choices
The model is solved by backward induction. Thus, we start by deriving the
agentsoutlays for given contract parameters. The agent employed by rm
1 chooses his outlay to maximize his expected payo¤. This payo¤ consists
of the xed payment, the variable payment in case of being selected by the
government and the costs entailed by outlay. It is given by
EU1 = 01 +
x1
x1 + x2
11   x1 (5)
Maximization of (5) yields the subsequent rst-order condition:7
x2
(x1 + x2)
211   1 = 0 (6)
A similar expression can be given for the second rms agent. It is obtained
from (6) by replacing the numerator by x1 and 11 by 12. Simultaneous
solution of the two conditions leads to outlays given by
x1 =
(11)
2 12
(11 + 12)
2 (7)
x2 =
11 (12)
2
(11 + 12)
2 (8)
Rent-seeking only depends on the variable payments 11 and 12. It is
straightforward to show that @xi
@1i
> 0. A higher reward for winning the
7The second-order condition is satised.
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contest leads to higher outlays. On the other hand @x1
@12
> 0 (respectively,
@x2
@11
> 0), only if 11 > 12 (11 < 12). Intuitively, this means that an
increase in the competitors reward for winning the contest will increase the
other agents outlay, only if competition becomes more intense. If, for ex-
ample, the second agent is more likely to win the contest (as 11 < 12) and
12 is further increased, competition is weakened and the rst agent chooses
to rent-seek less.
3.3 Simultaneous determination of the wage parame-
ters
We continue by determining the optimal wage parameters. Thereby, we have
to analyze both cases, the case of simultaneous and sequential determination
of the parameters. In this subsection, we consider the former case. The latter
case is dealt with in the next subsection.
We start by deriving the rst rms best response function. As mentioned
before, the rm faces a zero-prot constraint, which implies that
01 =
x1
x1 + x2
(S   11) (9)
or, inserting the expressions for rent-seeking outlays, as
01 =
11S
11 + 12
  (11)
2
11 + 12
(10)
Using conditions (7), (8) and (10), the agents expected utility becomes
EU1 =
11S
11 + 12
  (11)
2 12
(11 + 12)
2 (11)
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The rm chooses the wage parameters such that the agents expected utility
is maximized. Thereby, it has to consider the limited liability constraint.
We solve the maximization problem by rst considering the unconstrained
maximization problem, i.e. by neglecting the limited liability constraint.
Thereafter, we show that the optimal solution to this problem indeed satises
the limited liability constraint. This approach leads to the following rst-
order condition (follows from di¤erentiating (11)):8
12
(11 + 12)
2S  
211 (12)
2
(11 + 12)
3 = 0() (12)
11   12S
212   S = 0
The last condition characterizes the rst rms best response function. It
is strictly decreasing, i.e. increases in incentive strength of the competitor
are followed by a decrease in the own strength of incentives. The second
rms best response function results from (12) by switching 11 and 12. If
the wage contracts are determined simultaneously, the solution to the model
lies at the intersection of the two best-response functions. This solution is
symmetric and given by 11 = 12 = S. From (9), it follows that 01 = 0.
Thus, at the solution the limited liability constraint is fullled. Each agent
is paid according to a "sell-the-shop-contract". He is made residual claimant
to his actions and "pays" an entrance fee equal to zero. Further, equilibrium
outlays are given by x1 = x2 = S4 . As each agent wins the contest with
probability 0:5, the two agents expected utilities are the same and equal
8The second-order condition requires that   (11 + 12)S   (12)2 + 21112 < 0. It
holds for all equilibria to be derived.
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1 = 2 =
S
4
. Finally, note that aggregate rent-seeking is x1 + x2 = S2 ,
which is the same as in the individual contest, where outlay choices are not
delegated to agents. This is not surprising. Delegation of outlay choices to
agents leads to a moral-hazard problem, as outlays are unobservable to the
rm. As limited liability does not constrain the optimal solution, this moral
hazard problem can be solved completely by means of incentive pay. Hence,
rent-seeking expenditures are the same as in the case of non-delegation.
3.4 Sequential determination of the wage parameters
In the case of sequential choices, denote the rst-moving rm as leader and
the second-moving rm as follower. Further, suppose, without loss of general-
ity, that rm 1 acts rst. The di¤erence between this case and the preceding
case is that now the leader can a¤ect the followers choice of 12 by its own
choice of 11. In analogy to the argumentation Section 3.1, when determining
11 the leader takes 12 no longer as given. This entails the problem that
one cannot be sure, how the followers best response function looks like, for
this function depends on whether or not the limited liability constraint of the
followers agent is binding. To derive the equilibrium, we therefore introduce
a case distinction. In the rst case, the limited liability constraint of the
followers agent is assumed to be slack so that 12 = 11S211 S . In the second
case, it is assumed to be binding. The best response function is then derived
from the second rms zero-prot condition and 02 =   w. It is given by
12 =
S+ w
2
+
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w. Let us start with the rst case and suppose
additionally that w > 0. Inserting 12 = 11S211 S into (11), the rst agents
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expected utility simplies to
EU1 =
S
2
  S
2
411
(13)
It can immediately be seen that rm 1 wants to set 11 as high as possible.
In order to guarantee zero prot for rm 1, 01 then has to become innitely
small. It follows that, as long as w is nite, that is, as long as there is a limited
liability constraint, this constraint must be binding so that 01 =   w. The
optimal 11 is then the largest variable payment satisfying the zero-prot
constraint. Formally, it is given by
11 =
1:5S + w
2
+
1
2
r
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2 (14)
We started by assuming that the followers best response function is given
by 12 = 11S211 S . In order to show that we indeed consider an equilibrium, it
must be demonstrated that the limited-liability constraint of the followers
agent is really slack. Inserting (14) into the best-response function of the
follower yields
12 =
1:5S2 + wS + S
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2
S + 2 w + 2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2
(15)
From rm 2s zero-prot condition, the xed wage 02 can be shown to equal
02 =
S2

 0:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2


1:5S + w +
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2

0:5S + w +
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2

(16)
The denominator in (16) is strictly positive. Hence, working with the best-
response function 12 = 11S211 S is correct, whenever

 0:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2

>
12
0. This is equivalent to
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2 > 0:5S   w, or 4 wS > 0, which is
always fullled for w > 0.
Before turning to the second case, where the followers best response
function is 12 = S+ w2 +
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w, notice that, for w > 0, 11 >
S, EU1 > S4 and EU2 =
S2
411
< S
4
. This means that, under sequential
choices, the leader is better o¤ and the follower worse o¤ compared to the
model of simultaneous choices.9 In other words, by setting 11 = 1:5S+ w2 +
1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2, the leader can ensure its agent a payo¤ higher than S
4
.
This is important for the second case, which is analyzed next.
Suppose now that the limited liability constraint of the followers agent is
binding and the best-response function is given by 12 = S+ w2 +
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w.
It is extremely messy to derive the solution in analogy to the approach in
the rst case. Instead, we derive the following Lemma, which states that the
leader always prefers to make the limited liability constraint of the followers
agent slack rather than binding. It follows that, in equilibrium, the limited
liability constraint of the followers agent is never binding.
Lemma 1 For w > 0, the leaders agent is better o¤, if the limited liability
constraint of the followers agent is slack than if it is binding. Thus, the rst
9Note that this is somewhat critical, if we assume the agentsbargaining powers to
stem from the relative scarcity of rent-seekers. In this case, the followers agent is likely to
leave the rm. On the other hand, the two remaining reasons for having agents possessing
complete bargaining power do not imply this strong result. An agent being a better
bargainer than the rm he works in does not necessarily leave the rm, if agents in other
rms get a higher payo¤. Further, notice that the rst-mover advantage and, accordingly,
our results would even be enforced, if the follower would lose its agent.
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rm always chooses 11 = 1:5S+ w2 +
1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Lemma 1, the following proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 2 If w > 0, the leader sets 11 = 1:5S+ w2 +
1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2
and the follower reacts by setting 12 =

1:5S2+ wS+S
q
S2
4
+3 wS+ w2

S+2 w+2
q
S2
4
+3 wS+ w2
. The leaders
agent is better o¤ and the followers agent is worse o¤ than in the contest
with simultaneous actions.
We see that, under sequential contract announcements, the leaders agent
is better o¤ and the followers agent worse o¤ compared to the case of si-
multaneous actions. This complements the ndings of Leininger (1993) who
demonstrates that contestants are indi¤erent between moving sequentially
or simultaneously, when valuations for the prize are symmetric. Naturally,
the question arises, why the results di¤er. In general, as a rst-mover, one
can commit to a certain behavior. In a contest, for instance, one can choose
an aggressive strategy in order to show the opponent that one is extremely
willing to win the contest. Now, compare the two instruments available for
committing purposes. In Leininger (1993), the instrument is the chosen out-
lay. However, committing to an aggressive behavior is then very costly, as it
requires a high outlay choice. Therefore, it is unprotable. In contrast, in
the current model, commitment is via high-powered incentive contracts. This
will only be costly, if the opponent accepts the challenge and reacts by choos-
ing high-powered incentives as well.10 But as the best-response functions are
10Recall that @x1@12 > 0 () 11 > 12.
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downward-sloping, the opponent will never do so. Incentive contracts are
thus protable incentive devices so that becoming leader is benecial.
We conclude this subsection by briey commenting on the case, where
w = 0. In this case, the follower always sets 12 = S,11 which implies that
11 = S as well. Hence, the solution is the same as in the case of simultaneous
actions. Here, the rst-mover advantage of the leader disappears.
3.5 The timing of events
As mentioned in Section 2, the order of moves is endogenized in that each
rm may choose to announce the contract parameters either at date t = 1
or t = 2. The following matrix depicts the agentsexpected utilities for each
possible scenario.
Firm 1=F irm 2 1 2
1 S
4
; S
4
Y; Z
2 Z; Y S
4
; S
4
with Y = S
2
  S2
4

1:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+3 wS+ w2
 and Z = S2
4

1:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+3 wS+ w2
 .
Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium order of moves:
Proposition 3 If w > 0, both rms announce their contract parameters at
t = 1. Thus, the contract announcements occur simultaneously. If w = 0,
11This follows from inserting w = 0 into the two best response functions 12 =
1:5S2+ wS+S
q
S2
4 +3 wS+ w
2

S+2 w+2
q
S2
4 +3 wS+ w
2
or 12 = S+ w2 +
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w.
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the rms are indi¤erent between announcing the contract parameters at t = 1
or t = 2. Hence, there may be either simultaneous or sequential play.
Proof. Obvious from the payo¤ matrix and therefore omitted.
For w > 0, there is a rst mover advantage. Each rm prefers to act as
a leader to acting simultaneously and the latter to acting as a follower. It is
thus a dominant strategy for the rms to announce their contract parameters
at date t = 1. This necessarily leads to simultaneous play. Note that this is
exactly the logic that Leininger (1993) has shown to be incorrect, if outlay is
the only commitment device. Further, for w = 0, the rst mover advantage
disappears and the rms do no longer care about the order of moves.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a rent-seeking contest was considered, where agents spend
resources on behalf of rms in order to inuence the governments decision,
which rm to assign a contract. The agents are rewarded for success, that
is, for attracting the contract. The main focus of the paper was on, whether
commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is
protable. It was found that this is indeed the case. As a result, rms
have an interest to move rst, and competition for the rst-mover advantage
leads to simultaneous choices. This complements the ndings by Leininger
(1993), who shows that, in symmetric contests, commitment via rent-seeking
expenditures is unprotable.
Finally, it should be emphasized that there are many real-world situations,
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where the person expending resources is not the same as the person obtaining
the rent. In these cases, the rent-seekers have to be o¤ered incentive contracts
to engage in rent-seeking. In this paper, we tried to join the two elds of
contest and contract theory by introducing a moral hazard problem into a
contest model. This, however, was only a rst step. Many exciting problems
such as e.g. the screening of certain types of "rent-seekers" await.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 1. It says that, for all 11  0
and w > 0, EUnb1 > EU
b
1 , where EU
nb
1 =
S
2
  S2
4

1:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+3 wS+ w2
 ,
EU b1 =
11S
11+12
  (11)212
(11+12)
2 with 12 = S+ w2 +
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w. This is
equivalent to Z ( w; 11) > 0, with Z ( w; 11) = EUnb1  EU b1 . EUnb1 is clearly
increasing in w. Thus, if EU b1 is (weakly) decreasing in w, Z ( w;11) is
increasing in w. Consider the derivative
@EU b1
@ w
=   11S
@12
@ w
(11 + 12)
2  
(11)
3 @12
@ w
  (11)212 @12@ w
(11 + 12)
3
As @12
@ w
> 0, this derivative is (weakly) negative, if (11)2 1112+S (11 + 12) 
0, or (11   S) (11   12) + 2a11S  0. Suppose, for the moment, that
11  S and 11  12. Then, Z ( w;11) is increasing in w. Note that
Z(0; 11) =
S
4
  11S2
(11+S)
2 . If Z(0; 11)  0, then Z ( w; 11) > 0, for all w > 0.
Z(0; 11)  0 is equivalent to (11 + S)2  411S, which, using the second
binomial, can be shown to always hold.
We have shown that, for 11  S and 11  12, EUnb1 strictly exceeds
EU b1 . To complete the proof of Lemma 1, we need to show that, in equilib-
rium, it will never be the case that 11 > S or 11 > 12. We start with
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11 > 12. Divide the case, where the limited liability constraint of the
followers agent binds into two subcases. In the rst subcase, the limited lia-
bility constraint of the leaders agent binds as well. Then, it must be the case
that 11S (11)2 = 12S (12)2. From this condition, it follows that either
11 = 12 contradicting 11 > 12, or 11 6= 12 and 11 + 12 = S. Using
12 =
S+ w
2
+
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w, 11 > 12 can be rewritten as 11 > S + 2 w.
Therefore, it can never be the case that 11 > 12 and 11 + 12 = S to-
gether hold. In the second subcase, the limited liability constraint of the
leaders agent is slack, hence 01 >   w. This implies that the following two
conditions are met:
11
11 + 12
S   (11)
2
11 + 12
>   w
12
11 + 12
S   (12)
2
11 + 12
=   w
Combining these conditions o¤ers the set of parameters, for which the rst
limited liability constraint is slack and the second is binding. This set is
given by
A = f11; 12j11 > 12 ^ 11 + 12 < S _ 11 < 12 ^ 11 + 12 > Sg
Analogously to the rst subcase, it can never be that 11 > 12 and 11 +
12 < S together hold, which proves that 11  12.
It remains to demonstrate that it is never optimal to set 11 > S. First,
we show that x1 =
(11)
212
(11+12)
2 is strictly increasing in 11. Di¤erentiating
(11)
212
(11+12)
2 with respect to 11 yields
@

(11)
212
(11+12)
2

@11
=
211(12)
2 + (11)
3 @12
@11
  (11)2 12 @12@11
(11 + 12)
3
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This derivative is positive, if 2(12)2 + (11)
2 @12
@11
> 1112
@12
@11
. Recall that
12 =
S+ w
2
+
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w, and, hence, @12@11 =
w
2
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+11 w
. Then, the
inequality changes to
2(
S + w
2
+
s
S + w
2
2
+ 11 w)
2 + (11)
2 w
2
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w
> 11
0@S + w
2
+
s
S + w
2
2
+ 11 w
1A w
2
q 
S+ w
2
2
+ 11 w
After some calculations, the inequality becomes
 
(S + w)2 + 1:511 w
sS + w
2
2
+ 11 w +
(S + w)3
2
>  1:7511 (S + w) w   (11)
2 w
2
which is clearly fullled. Hence,
@

(11)
212
(11+12)
2

@11
> 0.
It follows that, with 11 > S, EU b1  S2  
S2

S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w


3S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w
2 . Thus,
if EUnb1 >
S
2
 
S2

S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w


3S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w
2 , EUnb1 always exceeds EU b1 . EUnb1 >
S
2
 
S2

S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w


3S+ w
2
+
q
(S+ w2 )
2
+S w
2 is equivalent to
 
3S + 2 w + 2
r
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2
!0@S + w
2
+
s
S + w
2
2
+ S w
1A
>
0@3S + w
2
+
s
S + w
2
2
+ S w
1A2
Dene X := S
2
4
+ 3 wS + w2 and Y :=
 
S+ w
2
2
+ S w and note that X > Y .
The inequality can be rewritten as
S w + 0:75 ( w)2 + w
p
Y +
p
X (S + w) + 2
p
XY > 0:75S2 + Y
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Notice that
p
XY > Y . Further,
p
X (S + w) +
p
XY > 0:75S2. Hence,
even for 11 > S, EUnb1 always exceeds EU
b
1 . Therefore, rm 1 never prefers
to make the limited liability constraint of the second rms agent binding. As
it can guarantee an equilibrium, where this constraint is slack, by choosing
11 =
1:5S+ w
2
+ 1
2
q
S2
4
+ 3 wS + w2, it will always do so. Q.E.D.
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